Related Contentin Los Angeles County
Case
PILAR VALDEZ-CONWAY VS JOHN SIMICH CONSTRUCTION INC, ET AL.
Aug 06, 2024 |Michael P. Vicencia |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24LBCV01650
Case
CRUZ GONZALEZ VS BODEGA LATINA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Aug 02, 2024 |Maurice A. Leiter |Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV19457
Case
JEFFREY VALIENTES VS AMA XU
Aug 07, 2024 |Bryant Y. Yang |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24PSCV02550
Case
ARNAE BOGHOSSIAN VS RYAN A HOITINK
Aug 06, 2024 |Joel L. Lofton |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24NNCV03346
Case
TRAN BOI THI VS REGINA ELAINE QUINONEZ
Aug 06, 2024 |Bryant Y. Yang |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24PSCV02524
Case
RACHAEL CHRISTINE HINMAN, ET AL. VS TRASHON LASHA FEARINGTON, ET AL.
Aug 06, 2024 |Huey P. Cotton, Jr. |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24VECV03715
Case
LINDA HUYNH, ET AL. VS CRYSTAL LETICIA MATA, ET AL.
Aug 06, 2024 |Ian C. Fusselman |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24NNCV03352
Case
MANUEL MORALES VS RICHARD HUMANIC, ET AL.
Aug 09, 2024 |Melvin D. Sandvig |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24CHCV02876
Case
ELCIAS HERNANDEZ, ET AL. VS LUCINA WELTON
Aug 05, 2024 |Hon. Gary I. Micon |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24CHCV02825
Ruling
CAMILA LOPEZ MAGALLANES VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRI
Aug 09, 2024 |BC684669
Case Number: BC684669 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: 55 Tentative on Plaintiffs Remaining Outstanding Motions in Limine At the 11/18/2022, the Court ruled on several motions in limine filed by the parties. The Court also deferred ruling on several of the motions in limine. The Court now tentatively rules as follows on Plaintiffs motions other than MIL No. 23 to Exclude any Evidence and Argument that this is a Medical Malpractice Action, which the Court will discuss with the parties at the FSC. The Court will issue a tentative ruling on Defendants remaining motions in limine at a later date. Plaintiffs MIL No. 5 to Exclude Concealed and Untimely Disclosed Sub Rosa is denied. The motion does not identify what specific evidence the moving party seeks to exclude and does not contain any supporting evidence that any such evidence even exists. Plaintiffs MIL No. 6 to Exclude Speculative Evidence, Testimony, and/or References that Plaintiffs Fall Resulted from Anything Other than Tripping on a Crack on the Playground is denied. Plaintiffs MIL No. 9 to Exclude Evidence, Witnesses, and Contentions not Disclosed in Discovery is denied. The motion fails to identify what specific evidence the moving party seeks to exclude, and thus the Court cannot make a meaningful order. Plaintiffs MIL No. 10 to Exclude Testimony and/or Reference to Statements Allegedly Made by Plaintiffs Parents at Hospital and Gossip is denied. Plaintiffs MIL No. 11 to Exclude Affirmative Defenses not Asserted in Defendants Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint is denied. This is not a motion in limine because it does not seek exclusion or limitation of any evidence. Rather, the moving party seeks to preclude the Defendant from raising arguments, but this is an improper use of a motion in limine. Plaintiffs MIL No. 13 to Exclude any Reference by Defendant and its Experts to Defendants Limited Funds as an Excuse for its Negligence is granted. Defendant has not explained what relevance its financial status has with respect to establishing liability or Plaintiffs claims for damages. Plaintiffs MIL No. 14 to Exclude any Reference by Defendant and Its Experts to Plaintiffs Past Economic Damages Including Medical Expenses is denied. Plaintiffs MIL No. 16 to Exclude any Reference to, or Suggest that Plaintiff Experienced Head Trauma Before or After the Subject Incident is denied. Plaintiffs MIL No. 21 to Exclude all Hearsay Testimony Regarding Plaintiffs Injury Incident is denied. Plaintiffs MIL No. 24 Regarding Scientific, Technical, Medical, and/or Professional Textbooks, Articles, and/or Reference is denied. Plaintiffs MIL No. 26 to Exclude Defendants Experts from Rendering any Improper Opinions Regarding Plaintiff Being Motivated by Secondary Gain is moot because Dr. Goldberg is no longer a testifying expert witness in this case. Plaintiffs MIL No. 28 to Exclude Defendants Responses Amended After the Discovery Cut-Off is denied.
Ruling
RICHARD FRIEDMAN VS WESTLAKE VILLAGE ATHLETIC CLUB, LP
Aug 05, 2024 |22STCV23564
Case Number: 22STCV23564 Hearing Date: August 5, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On July 20, 2022, Plaintiff Richard Friedman (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Westlake Village Athletic Club, LP, dba Westlake Athletic Club (Westlake) and Does 1-50 for general negligence and premises liability. On October 3, 2022, Westlake filed an answer. On November 20, 2023, the Court found that this case (case number 22STCV23564) and case number 23VECV03754 are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). Case number 22STCV23564 became the lead case. The cases were assigned to Department 28 in the Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Westlake and Does 1-50 for gross negligence. On January 12, 2024, the Court (1) granted the parties stipulated request to consolidate this case (case number 22STCV23564) and case number 23VECV03754, (2) consolidated the cases, and (3) assigned them to Department 28 in the Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. Case number 22STCV23564 remained the lead case. On March 15, 2024, the Court sustained Westlakes demurrer to the first amended complaint with leave to amend. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against Defendants Westlake and Does 1-50 for negligence (gross negligence). On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant California Athletic Clubs Management, Inc. as Doe 1. On June 21, 2024, Westlake filed a demurrer and a motion to strike. The demurrer and motion to strike were set for hearing on July 25, 2024. The Court continued the hearing to August 5, 2024. On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions. On July 29, 2024, Westlake filed replies. Trial is scheduled for October 1, 2024. PARTIES REQUESTS Westlake asks the Court to sustain the demurrer to the second amended complaint and strike portions of the second amended complaint. Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer and deny the motion to strike. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Demurrer The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: * * * (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, uncertain includes ambiguous and unintelligible. . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading].) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law). (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).) B. Motion to strike Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The Court may [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading of from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. (Ibid.) C. Gross negligence [O]rdinary negligence consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circ*mstances would employ to protect others from harm. (Anderson v. Fitness International, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 867, 881 (Anderson), quoting City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 753-754 (Santa Barbara).) [M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty, amounts to ordinary negligence. (Ibid., quoting Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 48.) However, to support a theory of [g]ross negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts showing either a want of even scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct. [Citations.] (Anderson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 881, quoting Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 754.) [G]ross negligence falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind . . . . (Ibid., quoting Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 184, 197; see Rosecrans v. Dover Images, Ltd. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082 [gross negligence is pleaded by alleging extreme conduct on the part of the defendant in addition to the traditional negligence elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages].) DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs second amended complaint The second amended complaint alleges the following: On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff collided with an unpadded, free-standing light post located within an enclosed tennis court located at 32250 West Triunfo Canyon Road in Westlake, California (premises), suffering a neck fracture and spinal cord injuries. Defendants were grossly negligent in the manner in which they owned, occupied, controlled, maintained, managed, and/or operated the premises, including the tennis court. Defendant's failure to provide padding on free-standing light posts, including the subject light posts, as well as the placing of the light post inside the playing area, in addition to the irregularity in the number of light posts on each side of the subject tennis court, as well as the inconsistency in distance between the light posts, such as the subject posts, was an extreme departure from the common practice of tennis court design and industry standards. As a result, Defendant's gross negligence was a substantial factor in causing in causing harm to [Plaintiff]. Plaintiff attached as exhibits to the second amended complaint (1) the Declaration of Alex Levitsky (Levitsky) (Exhibit 1) and (2) a photograph of a pickleball court (Exhibit 2). B. Westlakes motion to strike 1. The Levitsky declaration a. The declaration Levitsky, an architect who has designed tennis courts and other sports facilities, opines (among other things) that Westlakes facility of 11 tennis courts and 8 pickleball courts contains features that vary greatly from the guidelines set by the [United States Tennis Association] and [American Sports Builders Association] . . . . In Levitskys opinion: The most dangerous of the deviations from the standards, is that many light poles are located inside the overall playing area and are not padded, including on the subject tennis court. This is especially true due to the other numerous deviations listed above. Further exacerbating the conditions is that the poles are black, set on a black background of the fence fabric. From the court, they appear to be part of the fence line yet they are standalone fixed hazards. (Levitsky dec. p. 4.) According to Levitsky, Where tennis courts were built before the issue of fixed objects was addressed by the USTA in its publications, and included fixed objects inside the fence enclosures, the established remedy has been padding. Paddings single purpose is shock attenuation. Padding reduces the severity of impact and lowers the chance of injury. (Levitsky dec. p. 4.) b. Incorporation of exhibits by reference In Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contacting Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898 (Del Mar), the plaintiff acquired title to not only the [propertys] customary common areas, but pursuant to the Declaration of Restrictions recorded May 16, 1971, it also acquired title to the real property and structures. In other words, the individual owners only purchased the air space units within the apartment buildings and not the buildings and the land underlying them. (Del Mar, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 906.) The plaintiff attached the Declaration of Restrictions to the fourth amended complaint as an exhibit with its terms incorporated by reference into the pleading. The [plaintiff] specifically alleged it could prosecute the action on behalf of the owners because of the authority given to it under the Declaration. Defendants argue[d] this type of pleading is defective because material facts comprising a substantive cause of action cannot be pleaded by simple reference to an exhibit attached to the complaint. (Id. at p. 908.) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendants argument, observing that the plaintiff, by reference to the attached exhibit, clearly and directly incorporated the Declaration of Restrictions in its entirety as it pertained to standing. The incorporated restrictions defining a unit as an air space and prohibiting the owner from altering or modifying a wall within the acquired unit without first obtaining approval of such alteration or modification from the [plaintiff] are sufficient allegations of ownership interest in the [plaintiff]. (Del Mar, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 908.) Construing the pleadings liberally with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties, the court held that the pleadings adequately allege standing to withstand a general demurrer. (Ibid.) Here too, the assertions contained in the Levitsky declaration are incorporated by reference into the second amended complaint. (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 6:233, p. 6-81 [Plaintiff may attach a copy of a document to the complaint and incorporate it by reference. By doing so, the documents become part of the complaint as if set forth verbatim therein].) Plaintiff includes these assertions in an effort to plead the extreme conduct factor of his gross negligence claim. c. Motion to strike Levitsky declaration Westlake moves to strike the Levitsky declaration because it contains opinions, contentions, deductions, and conclusions of law. Westlake is correct that Levitskys declaration includes conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law, which the Court does not accept as true in ruling on a demurrer. (See Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25.) In addition, the declaration includes statements that discuss Westlakes facility generally without a specific reference to the tennis court and light pole involved in Plaintiffs accident. But the declaration also contains statements that do not include these defects. Accordingly, the Court strikes only the following portions of Levitskys declaration: Page 4, lines 1-8 Page 4, line 9: the phrase The most dangerous of these deviations from the standards, is that Page 4, lines 10-11: the sentence This is especially true due to the other numerous deviations listed above. Page 4, line 11: the phrase Further exacerbating the conditions is that Page 4, lines 27-28 Page 5, lines 1-3 Page 5, lines 6-7 The Court also strikes the following portion of the second amended complaint: the phrase and violations of those standards as discussed herein in Attachment 1 of 2, third full paragraph, last sentence. 2. The photograph of a pickleball court The second amended complaint attaches a photograph which it describes as photographs of the pickleball courts that have padding around the posts located within the overall playing area. (Exhibit 2.) The second amended complaint provides no other information about the photograph. The Court strikes the photograph from the second amended complaint. The Court also strikes the following portion of the second amended complaint: The sentence Attached here as Exhibit 2 are photographs of the pickleball courts that have padding around the posts located within the overall playing area in Attachment 2 of 2. C. Westlakes demurrer The second amended complaint alleges, among other things, that Westlake did not comply with industry standards by placing padding around the light pole which Plaintiff allegedly struck while playing tennis. The Court cannot say that, as a matter of law, these alleged facts do not demonstrate an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care. Plaintiff has pleaded facts which support his demurrer claim. The Court overrules the demurrer. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant Westlake Village Athletic Club, LP, dba Westlake Athletic Clubs motion to strike as follows. The Court strikes the following portions of the Declaration of Alex Levitsky (attached as Exhibit 1 to the second amended complaint) without leave to amend: Page 4, lines 1-8 Page 4, line 9: the phrase The most dangerous of these deviations from the standards, is that Page 4, lines 10-11: the sentence This is especially true due to the other numerous deviations listed above. Page 4, line 11: the phrase Further exacerbating the conditions is that Page 4, lines 27-28 Page 5, lines 1-3 Page 5, lines 6-7 The Court strikes the photograph of pickleball courts (attached as Exhibit 2 to the second amended complaint) without leave to amend. The Court strikes the following portions of the second amended complaint without leave to amend: (1) the phrase and violations of those standards as discussed herein in Attachment 1 of 2, third full paragraph, last sentence and (2) the sentence Attached here as Exhibit 2 are photographs of the pickleball courts that have padding around the posts located within the overall playing area in Attachment 2 of 2. In all other respects, the Court denies the motion to strike. The Court OVERRULES Defendant Westlake Village Athletic Club, LP, dba Westlake Athletic Clubs demurrer to the second amended complaint. Defendant Westlake Village Athletic Club, LP, dba Westlake Athletic Club is to file its answer to the second amended complaint within 10 days. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.
Ruling
TAYLOR BRISCOE VS HEIDE ORELLANA
Aug 06, 2024 |20STCV15001
Case Number: 20STCV15001 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On April 20, 2020, Plaintiff Taylor Briscoe (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Heide Orellana (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for negligence. On November 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing substituted service on Defendant of the summons, complaint, and other documents on November 2, 2021. On February 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing substituted service on Defendant of a statement of damages on February 14, 2022. On March 29, 2022, the clerk entered Defendants default. On July 15, 2022, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice. On March 3, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion to vacate the dismissal. On May 24, 2023, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. On November 17, 2023, the Court granted Intervenor Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Companys ex parte application to intervene and to file an answer in intervention. On November 27, 2023, Intervenor Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Intervenor) filed an answer in intervention and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Roes 1-50 for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief. On March 28, 2024, the Court denied Intervenors motion to set aside Defendants default. On July 8, 2024, Intervenor filed motions (1) to compel Plaintiffs responses to request for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions, (2) to compel Plaintiffs responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, and (3) to compel Plaintiffs responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions. The motions were set for hearing on August 6, 2024. Plaintiff did not file oppositions. INTERVENORS REQUESTS Intervenor asks the Court to compel Plaintiffs responses to (1) request for production of documents, set one, (2) special interrogatories, set one, and (3) form interrogatories, set one. Intervenor also requests sanctions. DISCUSSION The proofs of service attached to Intervenors motions do not state the method used to serve the motions. The proofs of service state that the motions were placed in sealed envelopes but do not state whether the motions were served by mail, personal service, facsimile, electronic transmission, or overnight delivery. The Court denies the motions without prejudice based on Intervenors failure to provide proper proofs of service. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice Intervenor Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Companys motion to compel Plaintiff Taylor Briscoes responses to request for production of documents, set one. The Court DENIES without prejudice Intervenor Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Companys motion to compel Plaintiff Taylor Briscoes responses to special interrogatories, set one. The Court DENIES without prejudice Intervenor Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Companys motion to compel Plaintiff Taylor Briscoes responses to form interrogatories, set one. Intervenor is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Intervenor is ordered to file proof of service of this ruling within five days.
Ruling
URIEL CALZADA MARTINEZ, ET AL. VS JEROME WINFIELD
Aug 08, 2024 |Renee C. Reyna |22STCV20297
Case Number: 22STCV20297 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 29 Calzada Martinez v. Winfield 22STCV20297 Defendants Motion to Reopen Discovery Tentative The motion is denied. BACKGROUND This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident on January 16, 2021, near the intersection of South Western Avenue and West 89th Street in Los Angeles. On June 21, 2022, Plaintiffs Uriel Calzada Martinez and Aracely De Los Santos filed the Complaint in this action, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against Defendants Jerome Winfield (Defendant) and Does 1 through 50. On April 13, 2023, Defendant filed his Answer to the Complaint. On filing, the Court set trial for December 19, 2023. In October 2023, the Court approved the parties stipulation to continue trial and set a new trial date of May 3, 2024. All discovery deadlines were reset based on the new trial date. On April 12, 2024, the Court continued trial, based on Defendants ex parte application, to July 23, 2024. As the request to continue was based primarily on scheduling issues for experts and counsel, the Court reset deadlines for expert depositions and motions relating to experts but did not extend the deadlines for fact discovery. Accordingly, fact discovery had closed on April 3, 2024, and remained closed. On June 21, 2024, the Court continued trial again, again based on Defendants ex parte application, this time to September 26, 2024. As the request to continue was based primarily on medical issues experienced by defendants trial counsel, the Court did not extend any discovery deadlines. Accordingly, fact discovery remained closed, and expert discovery closed on July 8. On July 2, 2024, the Court denied Defendants ex parte application to reopen discovery, without prejudice to Defendant seeking the same relief through a noticed motion. Back on May 23, 2024, Defendant had filed this motion to reopen discovery. The hearing was initially set for June 17 and was continued to July 22. Due to the cyber attack experienced by Los Angeles Superior Court, the hearing was continued again to August 8. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on June 4 and then another opposition on July 9. No reply has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD On motion of any party, the court may grant leave to complete discovery proceedings, or to have a motion concerning discovery heard, closer to the initial trial date, or to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set..¿ (Code Civ. Proc., section 2024.050, subd. (a).)¿ In exercising its discretion to grant or deny this motion, the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery.¿ (2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier.¿ (3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party.¿ (4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., section 2024.050, subd. (b)(1)-(4).)¿ A motion to reopen discovery shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., section 2024.050, subd. (a).)¿ A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2016.040.)¿ The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to extend or to reopen discovery, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., section 2024.050, subd. (c).)¿¿¿ DISCUSSION Defendants motion is denied for two independent reasons. First, Defendant has not satisfied the mandatory requirement to meet and confer prior to filing a motion. The declaration of counsel states that the parties met and conferred, but there is no detail (such as who met and conferred, what they discussed, when the meet and confer happened, and what position each side took). (Cappell Decl., ¶ 18.) Moreover, the supporting evidence Exhibit B is a brief email exchange on March 27, 2024; the email from Defendants counsel is two sentences long and addresses a trial continuance generally, not the request made now to reopen discovery. (Id., Exh. B.) A motion to reopen discovery must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., section 2024.050, subd. (a).)¿ Moving party has not satisfied this mandatory statutory requirement. Second, and independently, on the merits, Defendant has not shown a basis to reopen discovery. The court reaches this conclusion after a consideration of the four factors set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050, subdivision (b). The necessity and the reasons for the discovery.¿ Defendant contends that Plaintiffs injuries are complex. (Cappell Decl., ¶¶ 8-13 & Exh. A.) Defendants discovery is not complete, as Defendant seeks to depose Plaintiffs employer and health care providers. (Id., ¶ 14.) Defendant is also waiting on production of subpoenaed records from workers compensation, Plaintiffs employer, and Plaintiffs health insurance and automobile insurance carriers. (Id., ¶ 15.) Defendant has shown that the discovery he seeks is necessary and important in this matter. The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier.¿ Defendant asserts in general terms that he has been diligent. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 14; see also Mem. at pp. 3, 7.) The evidence, however, is to the contrary. Defendant filed his answer in April 2023, and had approximately one year to conduct discovery prior to the cutoff. Although Defendant points to certain things that occurred between April and early August 2023, Defendant has not explained why all of this necessary discovery including document productions and depositions of third party witnesses was not obtained, or at least sought, in 2023 or very early 2024. There is no evidence, for example, of when the subpoenas were served, when the productions were due, and when deposition notices were served. On this record, there is no showing of diligence by Defendant. Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party.¿ This motion has been continued twice, through no fault of Defendant. Nonetheless, trial is now set for September 26, 2024, and reopening discovery now will, as a practical matter, almost certainly require a further continuance of trial. The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action. Trial was initially set for December 19, 2023. It was then continued by stipulation to May 3, 2024; continued against to July 23, 2024, because of scheduling issues; and then continued again to September 26, 2023, because of a health issue of defendants lead trial counsel. Approximately nine months have elapsed between the original trial date and the current trial date. In considering these factors, and particularly the failure of Defendant to show diligence in seeking the discovery that he now contends is critical, the Court concludes that Defendant not shown good cause for the Court reopen discovery. For each of these two independent reasons, the the motion is DENIED. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Defendants motion to reopen discovery. Moving Party to provide notice.
Ruling
JOSE MANUEL FRUCTOSO GUEVARA MELENA VS LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
Aug 07, 2024 |23NWCV00160
Case Number: 23NWCV00160 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: C Melena v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Case No. 23NWCV00160 This is about an accident Plaintiff experienced while he was trying to enter a bus. Plaintiff applies ex parte to substitute Josefina Gomez Diaz for deceased Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not demonstrated irreparable harm. However, in the exercise of the Courts discretion, a hearing is specially set for October 17, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. The ex parte application is deemed to be the moving papers. Opposition and Reply briefs to be filed and served in compliance with the hearing date. Counsel is advised that a party seeking an earlier hearing date is typically required to reserve a hearing date on the Courts reservation system and then apply ex parte to advance the hearing date. Moving party to give notice.
Ruling
ALICIA RANDOLPH, ET AL. VS SB DTLA 1, LLC., A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Aug 14, 2024 |23STCV04074
Case Number: 23STCV04074 Hearing Date: August 14, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING ALICIA RANDOLPH, et al. vs. SBDTLA 1, LLC, et al. Case No.: 23STCV04074 Hearing Date: August 14, 2024 Defendants motion to compel Plaintiff Alicia Randolph to appear for deposition is GRANTED. Plaintiff is sanctioned, jointly and severally with counsel, $1,343.91. Defendants motion to compel Plaintiff Malcolm Hairston to appear for deposition is GRANTED. Plaintiff is sanctioned, jointly and severally with counsel, $1,343.91. The depositions are ordered to take place within 2 weeks. Sanctions are payable within 30 days. On 2/24/2023, Plaintiffs Alicia Randolph and Malcolm Hairston (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit alleging: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4; (2) tortious breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) private nuisance; (4) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; (5) negligence; (6) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; and (7) intentional influence to vacate. On 7/24/2024, Defendant 6th St. Loft, LLC (Defendant) moved to compel Plaintiff Alicia Randolph (Randolph) to appear for deposition. On 7/31/2024, Defendant 6th St. Loft, LLC (Defendant) moved to compel Plaintiff Malcolm Hairston (Hairston) to appear for deposition. For ease, the Court has consolidated its analysis into a single ruling. The motions are unopposed. Discussion I. Motion to Compel Deposition: Randolph On June 25, 2024, Randolph was served electronically with the Notice of Deposition (Exhibit A) at jacob@jacobfights.com; complex@jacobfights.com; and armando@jacobfights.com;. The Notice obligated Randolph to appear for deposition on July 18, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. via remote videoconference. Randolph never served an objection to the Notice. On July 16, 2024, two days before the deposition, Randolph was sent an email requesting confirmation of attendance at her deposition on July 18, 2024 (Exhibit B). On July 17, 2024, Randolph was sent a second email containing the login instructions and the link for attending the remote videoconference deposition (Exhibit C). Randolph did not respond to either email. Randolph did not appear for her properly noticed deposition, and Defendant's counsel had no choice but to take a Certificate of No-Appearance. California courts of appeal have long held that "a litigant has the right to take a proper deposition, and to receive responsive answers to proper questions&for the purposes of discovery or for use as evidence, or for both purposes. (Beverly Hills Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 861, 864-65, citing I. E. S. Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1955) 44 Cal.2d 559.) CCP section 2025.450(a) provides: If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action&, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410 [regarding defects in deposition notice], fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it&the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony[.] Here, Randolph did not attend her properly noticed deposition set for July 18, 2024, and counsel for Defendant was never served with a written notice objecting to the Notice. As such, Defendants motion is granted. Randolph is sanctioned, jointly and severally with counsel, $1,343.91, the full amount requested by Defendant minus the estimated fees for reviewing and responding to Randolphs opposition (the motion is unopposed). II. Motion to Compel: Hairston On June 25, 2024, Hairston was served electronically with the Notice of Deposition (Exhibit A) at jacob@jacobfights.com; complex@jacobfights.com; and armando@jacobfights.com. The Notice obligated Hairston to appear for deposition on July 18, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. via remote videoconference. Hairston never served an objection to the Notice. On July 16, 2024, two days before the deposition, Hairston was sent an email requesting confirmation of attendance at his deposition on July 18, 2024 (Exhibit B). On July 17, 2024, Hairston was sent a second email containing the login instructions and the link for attending the remote videoconference deposition (Exhibit C). Hairston did not respond to either email. Hairston did not appear for his properly noticed deposition, and Defendant's counsel had no choice but to take a Certificate of No-Appearance. California courts of appeal have long held that "a litigant has the right to take a proper deposition, and to receive responsive answers to proper questions&for the purposes of discovery or for use as evidence, or for both purposes. (Beverly Hills Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 861, 864-65, citing I. E. S. Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1955) 44 Cal.2d 559.) CCP section 2025.450(a) provides: If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action&, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410 [regarding defects in deposition notice], fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it&the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony[.] Here, Hairston did not attend his properly noticed deposition set for July 18, 2024, and counsel for Defendant was never served with a written notice objecting to the Notice. As such, Defendants motion is granted. Hairston is sanctioned, jointly and severally with counsel, $1,343.91, the full amount requested by Defendant minus the estimated fees for reviewing and responding to Hairstons opposition (the motion is unopposed). It is so ordered. Dated: August , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.
Ruling
GUILLERMO ACOSTA, JR. VS RODNEY DIGGS, ET AL.
Aug 06, 2024 |22STCV34623
Case Number: 22STCV34623 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 guillermo acosta, jr. ; Plaintiff, vs. rodney diggs , et al.; Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV34623 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: defendants motion to deem requests for admission admitted MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Rodney Diggs and Ivie McNeill and Wyatt Purcell & Diggs RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this motion. No opposition papers were filed. DISCUSSION Defendants Rodney Diggs and Ivie McNeill, Wyatt Purcell & Diggs (Defendants) filed the pending motion on June 27, 2024, moving the court for an order (1) deeming admitted the truth of the matters specified in the Requests for Admission served on plaintiff Guillermo Acosta, Jr. (Plaintiff), and (2) awarding monetary sanctions in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,300. On July 23, 2024, the court issued a minute order continuing the hearing on this motion from July 23, 2024 to August 6, 2024. (July 23, 2024 Minute Order, p. 1. ) The court further ordered [c]ounsel reflected on attached Certificate of Mailing . . . to give notice. (Ibid.) The July 23, 2024 Certificate of Mailing states that the courts July 23, 2024 order was served on counsel for Defendants. (July 23, 2024 Cert. of Mailing, p. 1 [listing attorney Rinat Klier Erlich, counsel for Defendants].) Thus, counsel for Defendants was required to serve a notice of the courts July 23, 2024 order on Plaintiff. Defendants did not file a notice of ruling and proof of service with the court establishing that Defendants counsel served Plaintiff with notice of the courts July 23, 2024 order. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff has not been given notice of the August 6, 2024 hearing date on Defendants motion. The court therefore finds that it is appropriate, and exercises its discretion, to continue the hearing on this motion to ensure that Plaintiff receives notice of the hearing date on Defendants motion to deem requests for admission admitted. ORDER The court orders that the hearing on defendants Rodney Diggs and Ivie McNeill, Wyatt Purcell & Diggss motion to deem requests for admission admitted is continued to August 27, 2024, at 10:00 a.m., in Department 53. The court orders defendants Rodney Diggs and Ivie McNeill, Wyatt Purcell & Diggs (1) to give notice of this ruling to plaintiff Guillermo Acosta, Jr., and (2) to file with the court the notice of ruling and a proof of service of the notice of ruling establishing that plaintiff Guillermo Acosta, Jr. has been served with the notice of ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 6, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
PETER RONEN, AN INDIVIDUAL VS DANIEL M. BALD, AN INDIVIDUAL
Aug 08, 2024 |23STCV31807
Case Number: 23STCV31807 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Case Name: Peter Ronen v. Daniel M. Bald d/b/a Law Offices of Daniel Bald Case No.: 23STCV31807 Motion: (1) Demurrer to First Amended Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint Moving Party: Defendants Daniel M. Bald and Law Offices of Daniel M. Bald Responding Party: Plaintiff Peter Ronen Tentative Ruling: Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is overruled. Defendants Motion to Strike is denied. Defendants to answer in 20 days. I. Background Plaintiff retained Defendants to prosecute a legal action for personal injury and property damage arising from a car accident. Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to prosecute the action, incurring sanctions, including terminating sanctions. Plaintiff alleges Defendants also failed to file the case within the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges Defendants concealed dismissal of the action from him despite Plaintiffs inquiries. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants. On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) general negligence. Plaintiff also seeks exemplary damages. II. Discussion A. Demurrer to FAC Defendants demur to the second cause of action for fraud pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f). Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to allege fraud with specificity, because the nature of the misrepresentations are not clearly alleged. The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damages. (Civ. Code §1709.) Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading. (Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 216.) Consistent with the rule requiring specificity in pleading fraud, a complaint must state ultimate facts showing that the defendant intended or had reason to expect reliance by the plaintiff or the class of persons of which he is a member. (Geernaert v. Mitchell (1995) 31 Cal. App. 4th 601, 608.) A plaintiff must allege what was said, by whom, in what manner (i.e. oral or in writing), when, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, under what authority to bind the corporation. (Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772, 782.) Plaintiff alleges fraud with sufficient specificity. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Daniel M. Bald d/b/a Law Offices of Daniel Bald affirmatively misrepresented to him repeatedly from April 13, 2018 to January 2023 that he was actively working on the case. (FAC, Second Cause of Action, FR-2.a.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant told him he was no longer practicing law prior to referring him to another attorney. (Id.) Plaintiff discovered later that the case had been dismissed from the subsequent attorneys paralegal. (Id.) Plaintiff also later discovered that Defendant did not prosecute the case and did not inform Plaintiff of discovery requests served by the opposing party. (Id. at FR-2.b.) Plaintiff identifies with specificity the nature of the misrepresentation, who said it and when it was said. These allegations are sufficient. Defendants Demurrer is overruled. Defendants to answer in 20 days. B. Motion to Strike Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs requests for attorneys fees, general damages for medical expenses and emotional distress and punitive damages. Defendants fail to make a coherent argument regarding the impropriety of Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees. Defendants merely state that such fees are not recoverable in a legal malpractice action. Defendants cite to Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 111-112 in support of their position that fees cannot be recovered in a malpractice action. However, Roberts stands for the opposite proposition, citing multiple grounds for recovery of fees in a legal malpractice claim, including contract, statute and where claimed as damages, the tort of another doctrine. (Roberts, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at 112.) Defendants argue Plaintiff may not recover emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action. Generally, a plaintiff may not recover emotional distress damages for legal malpractice. (Merenda v. Supr. Ct. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 4. (disapproved of on other grounds in Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037).) However, Plaintiff does not only allege legal malpractice. Plaintiff also alleges a fraud cause of action, for which emotional distress damages are legally recoverable. Although damages for emotional distress can be recovered in a fraud cause of action, such damages have been allowed only as an aggravation of other damages. (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1269.) Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages for legal malpractice. However, Plaintiff successfully alleges a cause of action for fraud. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 3294, punitive damages are available for fraud, malice or oppression. Defendants Motion to Strike is denied. III. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer to the FAC is overruled. Defendants Motion to Strike is denied. Defendants shall serve and file an answer on or before August 30, 2024.
Document
ROYA SHERMAN VS RETAIL OPPORTUNITY INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
Feb 28, 2020 |Daniel M. Crowley |Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death - Uninsured Motorist (General Jurisdiction) |Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death - Uninsured Motorist (General Jurisdiction) |20STCV08459
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MONICA MASCORRO VS PAULA GROTT ET AL
Jul 29, 2014 |Patricia D. Nieto |Motor Vehicle - PI/PD/WD (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - PI/PD/WD (General Jurisdiction) |BC553129
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GRACE TURANO VS JAMES RICHARD PECKINPAUGH, II
Mar 03, 2020 |Michael E. Whitaker |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |20STCV08619
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JOSE MAZARIEGOS ARGUETA VS W.H.B.T. INC., ET AL.
Feb 27, 2020 |Jon R. Takasugi |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |20STCV08157
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JAMES SHAYLER VS TOWNE CENTER WEST I, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 31, 2024 |Michael P. Vicencia |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |24LBCV01606
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MARIELITA PALACIOS VS BUILD A SIGN LLC, A DELAWARE ENTITY,
Aug 07, 2024 |Upinder S. Kalra |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV19765
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JAVIER CASTANEDA VS ASSOIATED SEWING MACHINE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL.
Aug 02, 2024 |Armen Tamzarian |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV19385
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GLORIA HERRERA VS SUPERIOR WASH, LLC, ET AL.
Aug 07, 2024 |Wendy L. Wilcox |Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |24CMCV01193
